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There has been considerable interest in understanding the relation between default-risk and
equity returns in the ¯nance literature. For example, Chan and Chen (1991) contend that
the size e®ect is related to the presence of stressed ¯rms in small stock portfolios. Similarly,
Fama and French (1993) argue that a ¯rm with high book-to-market ratio is relatively
stressed. Vassalou and Xing (2004) use Merton (1974) model to compute default measures for
individual ¯rms and assess the e®ect of default risk on equity returns. They ¯nd that the size
e®ect is a default e®ect, and this is also largely true for the book-to-market e®ect. However,
recent empirical studies (Dichev (1998), Gri±n and Lemmon (2002), Campbell, Hilscher,
and Szilagyi (2008)) document a negative relationship between default risk and realized
stock returns. In addition, Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) ¯nd that correcting for
risk using the standard risk factors worsens the anomaly.
In the credit risk literature, An empirical study by Zhang, Zhou, and Zhu (2008) ¯nds
that the volatility and jump risks of individual ¯rms identi¯ed from high-frequency equity
prices can predict about 50% of the variation in default risk, measured by credit default swap
spreads. The jump risk alone forecasts about 20%. Since jumps a®ect higher moments of
equity returns, their ¯ndings suggest a relationship between default risk and higher moments
of equity returns. In addition, numerous papers (see Odean (1999), and Polkovnichenko
(2005)) have documented that investors commonly do not hold well diversi¯ed portfolios.
Given the lack of diversi¯cation in investor holdings, investors will care about the level of
idiosyncratic skewness in their portfolio returns. Brunnermeier, Gollier, and Parker (2007),
Barberis and Huang (2008) and Mitton and Vorkink (2008) provide theoretical models to
show that idiosyncratic skewness is priced in equilibrium. More recently, Boyer, Mitton, and
Vorkink (2009) document an empirical evidence that stocks with high expected idiosyncratic
skewness have on average low returns. Because lagged skewness alone does not adequately
forecast skewness, they regress time t+1 idiosyncratic skewness on time t predictor variables,
and use the expected skewness as their measure of expected idiosyncratic skewness.
1In this paper, we intend to examine the relationship between expected equity returns and
another measure of idiosyncratic higher moments (hereafter idiosyncratic coskewness), and
provide a possible explanation to the seemingly anomalous ¯nding that high stressed ¯rms
earn low equity returns. There are several contributions of this paper.
First, we show that in a model in which there are heterogeneous investors who may
care about the skewness of their portfolios, the expected return on risky assets depends on
idiosyncratic coskewness betas, which measures the covariance between idiosyncratic variance
and the market return. In addition, there is a negative (positive) relationship between
idiosyncratic skewness and equity returns when the idiosyncratic coskewness beta is positive
(negative).
Second, we test this prediction using equity returns. When estimated idiosyncratic
coskewness betas are positive, there is a negative relationship between excess returns and id-
iosyncratic coskewness betas. When estimated idiosyncratic coskewness betas are negative,
the relationship becomes positive. In addition, when we control for risk using the market fac-
tor, the Fama-French three factors, and the Carhart four factors, the relationship between
excess returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas becomes stronger. In other words, the
standard risk factors cannot explain why portfolios with low idiosyncratic coskewness betas
earn high excess returns when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive, and why portfolios
with high idiosyncratic coskewness betas earn high excess returns when idiosyncratic coskew-
ness betas are negative. We form two long-short portfolios, which long the portfolio with
the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and short the portfolio with the highest idiosyn-
cratic coskewness beta for both groups with positive and negative idiosyncratic coskewness
betas, to capture the systematic variation in excess portfolio returns sorted by idiosyncratic
coskewness betas. We call them idiosyncratic coskewness factors, ICSK1 for the groups with
positive idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and ICSK2 for the groups with negative idiosyn-
cratic coskewness betas. The average monthly excess returns for ICSK1 and ICSK2 over the
sample period January 1971 to December 2006 are 0.61% (t = 1:76) and -0.76% (t = 2:16)
2respectively.
Third, we show that the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors can explain the anoma-
lous ¯nding that high stressed ¯rms earn low equity returns. As documented in Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), the individual skewness is almost a monotonic function of
their distress measure. We show that in an economy where investors have heterogeneous
preferences, the equilibrium expected excess return depends on excess market return, id-
iosyncratic skewness, and idiosyncratic coskewness betas. We use Merton (1974) model to
measure default risk for individual ¯rms, and ¯nd the anomalous negative relation between
default risk and equity returns. When we regress distress-sorted portfolio returns on the two
idiosyncratic coskewness factors ICSK1 and ICSK2, we ¯nd that factor loadings on ICSK1
are generally declining with distress measures, and factor loadings on ICSK2 are gener-
ally increasing with distress measures. The two idiosyncratic coskewness factors reduce the
monthly excess return of a long-short portfolio holding the portfolio with the lowest distress
measure and shorting the portfolio with the highest distress measure from 1.42% to 0.65%.
Including other standard risk factors, such as the market, size, value, and momentum factors,
will not signi¯cantly alter the factors loadings on the two idiosyncratic factors and the alpha
of the long-short portfolio.
Our paper is one of several recent papers that intend to explain the anomalous ¯nding
that high stressed ¯rms earn low equity returns. Garlappi and Yan (2008) show that in a
model that considers the bargaining game between equity-holders and debt-holders, equity
returns depend on a measure of \shareholder advantage ". When shareholder advantage is
strong, the relation between default probability and equity returns is humped and downward
sloping. When shareholder advantage is weak, the relation is upward sloping. Avramov,
Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007a) show that the negative relationship between credit
risk and average equity returns exist only during credit rating downgrade periods and is
attributable to low-rated ¯rms that experience considerable negative returns during the 1-
year period around downgrades. Given the high return volatility of high stressed portfolios,
3Chava and Purnanandam (2008) argue against using realized returns as a proxy for expected
returns. They use implied cost of capital computed from analysts forecasts as a measure of
ex-ante expected returns. They ¯nd a signi¯cant positive relation between default risk and
realized returns during the pre-1980 period. The negative relation between default risk and
equity returns is a surprise to investors during the post-1980 period. Chen and Zhang (2008)
propose a new three-factor model consists of the market factor and common factors based on
investment and returns on asset. Their model can explain many empirical ¯ndings in ¯nance,
such as the positive relations of average returns with short-term prior returns and earnings
surprises as well as the negative relations of average returns with ¯nancial distress, net
stock issues, and asset growth. High stressed ¯rms usually experience considerable negative
returns in the past. It is no surprise that their model can explain the negative relation
between default risk and equity returns since one of their factors is based on past equity
returns.
Our paper provides an alternative explanation for the negative relation between default
risk and equity returns. We show that high stressed ¯rms earn low equity returns because
of the contribution of their idiosyncratic coskewness. For ¯rms with positive idiosyncratic
coskewness betas, high stressed ¯rms have low idiosyncratic coskewness betas. In contrast,
for ¯rms with negative idiosyncratic coskewness betas, high stressed ¯rms have high idiosyn-
cratic coskewness betas. These relations contribute to low equity returns for high stress
¯rms because there is a negative relation between equity returns and idiosyncratic coskew-
ness betas for ¯rms with positive idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and there is a positive
relation between equity returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas for ¯rms with negative
idiosyncratic coskewness betas.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents both theoretical and empirical
relation between idiosyncratic coskewness betas and equity returns. Section 3 describes our
measure of default risk based on Merton's (1974) model and the anomalous negative relation
between default risk and equity returns. Section 4 examines the relation between default
4risk and idiosyncratic coskewness factors. Section 5 concludes.
2 Idiosyncratic Coskewness and Equity Returns
2.1 Theory
Many empirical papers have documented that investors usually hold under-diversi¯ed port-
folios with a small number of securities. One possible explanation is that investors care
about idiosyncratic skewness in their portfolios. Barberis and Huang (2008) show that
idiosyncratic skewness is priced in equilibrium under the assumption that investors have
preferences based on cumulative prospect theory. Mitton and Vorkink (2008) demonstrate
the same result under the assumption of heterogeneous preference for skewness. Campbell,
Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008) report average skewness of individual returns for distress-sorted
portfolios in Table VI of their paper. The result shows that average skewness of individual
returns are almost monotonically increasing with default risk. In other words, high default-
risk stocks have high idiosyncratic skewness. We intend to examine the relationship between
equity returns and idiosyncratic coskewness in a linear asset pricing model, and investigate
empirically if investors' preference for skewness can explain the anomaly that high distressed
¯rms earn low returns.
In our model, we follow Mitton and Vorkink (2008) and assume that the universe of
stocks consists of two assets and a risk-free asset. The return vector of the two securities is
denoted as R = [RM;R1]. The covariance of asset returns is denoted §.
In our economy, we assume that there are two investors, a \traditional "investor and
a \Lotto investor ". The traditional investor utility can be approximated as a standard
quadratic utility function over wealth
U(W) ' E(W) ¡
1
2¿
V ar(W); (1)
5where W is the investor terminal wealth, ¿ > 0 is the coe±cient of risk aversion. ? and
Hlawitschka (1994) show that the quadratic utility is a reasonable approximation of standard
expected utility functions. And it seems reasonable to assume that in the population the
traditional investor behave as a mean-variance investor. The \Lotto investor "has the same
preferences as the traditional investor over mean and variance, but also has preference for
skewness
U(W) = E(W) ¡
1
2¿
V ar(W) +
1
3Á
Skew(W); (2)
where Á is the investor skewness preference. As shown in Cass and Stiglitz (1970), utilities (1)
and (2) can lead, under certain restrictions, to equilibrium portfolio separation. As Á ¡! 1,
the Lotto investor utility approaches the traditional investor utility as in Markowitz (1959).
It is insightful to notice that if all investors are lotto investors, then the model would be
reduced to Kraus and Litzenberger (1976) coskewness model. Each investor maximizes (1)
and (2) subject to his budget constrain of the form
Wi = W0;iRf + !
T
i (R ¡ Rf1);
where Rf is the return on the risk-free asset, R¡Rf1 is the excess return, and !i is the asset
demand. For the traditional (hereafter T ) investor, the First-order conditions of (1) gives
E(R ¡ Rf1) ¡
1
¿
§!T = 0: (3)
For Lotto investors (hereafter L), the First-order conditions can be simpli¯ed to
E(R ¡ Rf1) ¡
1
¿
§!L +
1
Á
E(!
T
L(R ¡ ER)(R ¡ ER)
T!L)(R ¡ ER) = 0: (4)
Since the economy should generate the same expected excess return regardless of investor
6preferences, the expected excess returns in (3) and (4) have to be identical. This allows us
to write the equilibrium expected excess return as
E(R ¡ Rf1) =
1
2¿
§(!L + !T ) ¡
1
2Á
E(!
T
L(R ¡ ER)(R ¡ ER)
T!L)(R ¡ ER):
Notice that !L + !T represents the aggregate demand in this economy, hence (!L + !T )T R
can be treated as the return on the market portfolio. Finally, the equilibrium expected excess
return on the risky asset is
E(R1 ¡ Rf) =
1
2¿
Cov(R1;RM) ¡
1
2Á
Cov((!
T
L(R ¡ ER)(R ¡ ER)
T !L);R1): (5)
Equation (5) is not the coskewness model put forward in Harvey and Siddique (2000) nor
the coskewness model of Kraus and Litzenberger (1976). Let °ISK = E(R1 ¡ER1)3 denotes
the asset one idiosyncratic skewness. The expected excess return on the risky asset (5) is
E(R1 ¡ Rf) = ¸M¯CAPM + ¸CSK¯CSK + ¸ICSK°ICSK + ¸ISK°ISK; (6)
where
¯CAPM =
Cov(R1;RM)
V ar[RM]
; ¯CSK =
Cov(R1;(RM ¡ ERM)2)
V ar[RM]
; ¯ICSK =
Cov((R1 ¡ ER1)2;RM)
V ar[RM]
;
with
¸M =
1
2¿
¾
2
M, ¸CSK = ¡
(!L;M)2
2Á
¾
2
M, ¸ICSK = ¡
!L;M!L;1
Á
¾
2
M, ¸ISK = ¡
(!L;1)2
2Á
:
The expected excess return depends on the standard CAPM beta, ¯CAPM, the coskewness
beta as de¯ned in Harvey and Siddique (2000), ¯CSK, the idiosyncratic coskewness beta,
¯ICSK, and the idiosyncratic skewness as de¯ned in Mitton and Vorkink (2008). As Á ¡! 1,
the expected excess return on the risky asset reduces to the risk premium in the CAPM
7model.
The impact of the standard CAPM beta, the coskewness beta, and the expected idiosyn-
cratic skewness on asset returns is consistent with theoretical predictions since ¸M is positive,
and ¸CSK and ¸ISK are negative. However, the impact of the idiosyncratic coskewness beta
on asset returns need to be clari¯ed because ¸ICSK can be positive and negative, depending
on whether the lotto investor buys or sells the risky asset. Our model set up is similar to
Mitton and Vorkink (2008), but the outcome is di®erent from Mitton and Vorkink (2008)
because we relax the assumption that the idiosyncratic coskewness beta is not zero. To iso-
late the e®ect of idiosyncratic skewness on excess return, Mitton and Vorkink (2008) assume
that the idiosyncratic coskewness beta is zero.
To investigate the relation between idiosyncratic coskewness betas and expected returns
we consider two assets and form a portfolio of these two assets by changing the weight on
these assets from -1 to 1. We then study the return di®erence between the portfolio with
the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic
coskewness beta. To perform our analysis, we ¯x the returns of the two assets and their
idiosyncratic coskewness betas. The top left graph in Figure 1 shows the relationship between
the portfolio idiosyncratic coskewness beta and the expected return when the idiosyncratic
coskewness betas for both assets are positive. SET1=(0.06,0.01,0.005,0.009) contains the
expected returns, and idiosyncratic coskewness betas of the two assets respectively. As
shown in this graph, the di®erence in expected returns between the portfolio with the highest
idiosyncratic coskewness beta and the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta
is negative. For a di®erent set of values, SET1=(0.06,0.01,0.009,0.006), we reach the same
conclusion in the top left graph in Figure 2.
The bottom right graph in Figure 1 shows the relationship between idiosyncratic coskew-
ness betas and expected returns when the idiosyncratic coskewness betas for both assets are
negative. SET4=(0.06,0.01,-0.005,-0.009) contains the expected returns, and idiosyncratic
coskewness betas of the two assets respectively. As shown in this graph, the di®erence in
8expected returns between the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and
the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta is positive. For a di®erent set
of values, SET4=(0.06,0.01,-0.009,-0.005), we reach the same conclusion in the bottom right
graph in Figure 2.
The top right graph in Figure 1 shows the relationship between idiosyncratic coskewness
betas and expected returns when asset one has negative idiosyncratic coskewness beta and
asset two has positive idiosyncratic coskewness beta, SET3=(0.06,0.01,-0.005,0.009). The
bottom left graph in Figure 1 shows the relationship between idiosyncratic coskewness betas
and expected returns when asset one has positive idiosyncratic coskewness beta and asset
two has negative idiosyncratic coskewness beta, SET3=(0.06,0.01,0.005,-0.009). As shown in
these graphs, there is no a clear relationship between the portfolio idiosyncratic coskewness
beta and its expected return. We reach the same conclusion in the top right and bottom left
graphs in Figure 2. This suggests that, when all assets are used regardless of the sign of their
idiosyncratic coskewness betas, the relationship between excess returns and idiosyncratic
coskewness betas is \hump-shaped".
2.2 Equity Returns and Measures of Higher Moments Risk
In this section, we use the entire CRSP equity data to investigate the relationship between
equity returns and coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skew-
ness respectively. At the beginning of each month, we use past 12-month daily data on
individual stock returns to compute coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and
idiosyncratic skewness respectively as de¯ned in the previous section, and form portfolios
sorted by coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness re-
spectively. To reduce the liquidity e®ect on equity returns, we eliminate ¯rms with no
transaction days larger than 120. We also eliminate stocks with prices less than $1 at the
end of a month. Following the same method used to compute returns for distress-sorted
portfolios, we compute value-weighted returns for portfolios sorted by coskewness betas,
9idiosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness respectively.
Tables 1 reports the results for the decile portfolios sorted by coskewness betas, id-
iosyncratic coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness respectively. For the ten portfolios
sorted by coskewness betas, there is a slight negative relation between excess equity returns
and coskewness betas, which is consistent with Harvey and Siddique (2000). However, the
relationship almost disappears when we control for the Fama-French factors. In addition,
the relationship becomes positive when we control the Carhart four factors. For the ten
portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas, the relationship between excess equity
returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas is hump-shaped, i.e. portfolios with both lowest
and highest idiosyncratic coskewness betas have lower excess returns than the others. This
hump-shaped relationship does not disappear even when we control the market factor, the
Fama-French factors, or the Carhart factors. This result is consistent with our theoretical
prediction. For the ten portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic skewness, there is a slight positive
relation between excess equity returns and idiosyncratic skewness. However, this relationship
basically disappear when we control the standard risk factors, such as the market factor, the
Fama-French factors, or the Carhart factors. Table 1 con¯rms our theoretical ¯nding our
measure of idiosyncratic coskewness is di®erent from the standard coskewness and idiosyn-
cratic skewness measure. It is important to point out that empirically testing the relation
between idiosyncratic skewness and returns is not a straightforward exercise. The primary
obstacle is that ex ante skewness is di±cult to measure. As opposed to variances and co-
variances, idiosyncratic skewness is not stable over time. This explains the marginal e®ect
of idiosyncratic skewness on expected returns1.
To further investigate the cross-sectional relation between idiosyncratic coskewness be-
tas and idiosyncratic skewness, we run a simple OLS regression of idiosyncratic coskewness
1To avoid this obstacle, Boyer, Mitton, and Vorkink (2009) regress idiosyncratic skeweness on a set of
predictor variables and use the expected component of their linear regression as a measure of expected
idiosyncratic skewness. Because the goal of this paper is to investigate whether idiosyncratic coskewness
betas explain the default risk puzzle, we do not investigate the empirical relationship between expected
idiosyncratic skewness and expected idiosyncratic coskewness. We leave this issue for future research.
10betas on idiosyncratic skewness each month using the estimated idiosyncratic coskewness
betas and idiosyncratic skewness for all available ¯rms. The time series of estimated slope
coe±cients and R2s are plotted in Figure 3. It shows that there is a positive relation be-
tween cross-sectional idiosyncratic coskewness and idiosyncratic skewness during the sample
period. However, the positive relation is very weak as the average R2s from the regres-
sions is 1.8%. The results demonstrate that idiosyncratic coskewness betas and idiosyncratic
skewness measure di®erent aspects of equity returns.
2.3 Equity Returns Sorted by Positive and Negative Idiosyncratic
Coskewness
We show in the last section that there is a hump-shaped relation between equity returns and
idiosyncratic coskewness betas. To further investigate that relationship, we divide ¯rms into
two groups according to the sign of their idiosyncratic coskewness betas. For each group,
we then rank the stocks based on their past idiosyncratic coskewness betas and form ten
value-weighted decile portfolios. Following the same method used to compute returns for
distress-sorted portfolios, we compute value-weighted returns for idiosyncratic coskewness
beta-sorted portfolios in each groups.
Tables 2 and 3 report the results for ten portfolios with positive idiosyncratic coskewness
betas and ten portfolios with negative idiosyncratic coskewness betas respectively. Panel
A reports average excess returns, in monthly percentage points, of idiosyncratic coskewness
beta-sorted portfolios and the average return of a long-short-portfolio holding the portfolio
with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and shorting the portfolio with the highest
idiosyncratic coskewness beta. Panel A also reports alphas with respective to the CAPM, the
Fama-French three-factor model, and the four-factor model proposed by Carhart (1997) that
includes a momentum factor. Panel B reports estimated factor loadings in the four-factor
model with adjusted R2s. Figures 4 and 5 plot the alphas from regressions for ten positive
portfolios with positive idiosyncratic coskewness betas and ten portfolios with negatively
11idiosyncratic coskewness betas respectively.
The average excess returns for the ¯rst nine portfolios with positive idiosyncratic coskew-
ness betas are almost °at. The average excess return for the tenth portfolio, which has the
highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta, is much lower than those for the other nine portfo-
lios. The average return for the long-short-portfolio which goes long the portfolio with the
lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and short the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic
coskewness beta is 0.81% with a t-statistic of 1.87. The results weakly support the predic-
tion that excess returns decline with idiosyncratic coskewness betas rising when idiosyncratic
coskewness betas are positive.
There is also an interesting pattern in estimated factor loadings reported in Table 2.
Portfolios with low idiosyncratic coskewness betas have low loadings on the market factor,
negative loadings on the size factor SMB, and positive loadings on the value factor HML.
Portfolios with high idiosyncratic coskewness betas have high loadings on the market factor,
positive and high loadings on the size factor SMB, and negative loadings on the value factor
HML. There is no clear pattern in the estimated factor loadings for the momentum factor
UMD.
These factor loadings implies that when we correct risk using the market factor or the
Fama-French three factors, we will not be able to explain why the portfolio with the highest
idiosyncratic coskewness beta has such low excess returns compared to the other nine port-
folios. On the contrary, it will worsen the anomaly. In fact, alphas in the regressions with
respect to the CAPM, the Fama-French three-factor model, and Carhart four-factor model
are almost monotonic declining with idiosyncratic coskewness betas increasing. A long-short
portfolio that holds the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and shorts
the portfolio with the highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta has a CAPM alpha of 1.21%
with a t-statistic of 3.14; it has a Fama-French three-factor alpha of 1.12% with a t-statistic
of 4.29; and it has a Carhart four-factor alpha of 0.98% with a t-statistic of 4.02. When we
correct risk using the standard factors, we ¯nd stronger evidence to support the prediction
12that there is a negative relationship between excess returns and idiosyncratic coskewness
betas when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are negative.
For the ten portfolios with negative idiosyncratic coskewness betas, the average excess re-
turns reported in Table 3 are almost monotonically increasing with idiosyncratic coskewness
betas. It is consistent with the prediction that there is a positive relationship between excess
returns and idiosyncratic coskewness betas when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are negative.
A long-short portfolio that holds the portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta
and shorts the portfolio with the highest coskewness beta has an excess return of -0.63%
with a t-statistic of 2.00.
There is a clear pattern in estimated factor loadings for the market factor and the size
factor SMB in the four-factor regression. Portfolios with low idiosyncratic coskewness be-
tas have high loadings on the market factor and the size factor SMB. Portfolios with high
idiosyncratic coskewness betas have low loadings on the market factor and the size factor
SMB. There is no clear pattern in estimated factor loadings for the value factor HML and
the momentum factor UMD. These loading implies that when we cannot explain the return
di®erence using the standard risky factors. In fact, controlling those factors increases return
di®erence for portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas. The same long-short port-
folio has a CAPM alpha of -0.88% with a t-statistic of 2.74; it has a Fama-French three-factor
alpha of -0.85% with a t-statistic of 3.76; and it has a Carhart four-factor alpha of -0.61%
with a t-statistic of 2.48.
In summary, the empirical results support that the relationship between equity returns
and idiosyncratic coskewness betas is positive when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are neg-
ative, and negative when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive. In addition, we ¯nd
that the return di®erence between portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas, with
either positive or negative values, cannot be explained by the standard risk factors, such as
the market factor, the size factor, the value factor, and the momentum factor. In the next
section, we will examine the relationship between default risk and idiosyncratic coskewness.
132.4 Idiosyncratic Coskewness Factors
We investigate two value-weighted hedge portfolios that capture the e®ect of idiosyncratic
coskewness. As discussed in the previous section, at the beginning of each month, we use
past 12 month daily equity returns to estimate idiosyncratic coskewness beta for each in-
dividual ¯rm. We ¯rst divide ¯rms into two groups according to the sign of the estimated
idiosyncratic coskewness betas, then we form value-weighted decile portfolios based estimated
idiosyncratic coskewness betas for both groups. We compute the excess portfolio returns in
the following month (i.e. post-ranking). We construct the long-short portfolio holding the
portfolio with the lowest idiosyncratic coskewness beta and shorting the portfolio with the
highest idiosyncratic coskewness beta. The long-short portfolio in the group with negative
idiosyncratic coskewness beta is called ICSK1, and the long-short portfolio in the group with
positive idiosyncratic coskewness beta is called ICSK2. We use ICSK1 and ICSK2 to proxy
for idiosyncratic coskewness factors.
The average monthly excess returns for ICSK1 and ICSK2 are 0.81% and -0.63% respec-
tively over the period January 1971 to December 2006. We reject the hypothesis that the
mean excess return for factor ICSK2 is zero at the 5 percent level of signi¯cance. But we
cannot reject the same hypothesis for factor ICSK1. A high factor loading on ICSK1 should
be associated with high expected excess returns. In contrast, for factor ICSK2, a high factor
loading should be associated with low expected excess returns.
2.5 Can Idiosyncratic Coskewness Factors Explain What Other
Risk Factors Do Not?
The failures of the CAPM model often appear in speci¯c groups of securities that are formed
on size, book-to-market ratio and momentum. To understand how idiosyncratic coskewness
factors enter asset pricing, we analyze the pricing errors from other asset pricing models
such as the Fama-French three-factor model, and the four-factor model proposed by Carhart
14(1997).
We carry out time-series regression of excess returns,
ri;t = ®i +
K X
j=1
b ¯jfj;t + ei;t; for i = 1;:::;N;t = 1;:::;T; (7)
and jointly test whether the intercepts, ®i, are di®erent from zero using the F-test of Gibbons,
Ross, and Shanken (1989) where F » (N;T ¡ N ¡ K). We test the Fama-French three
factor model and Carhart four-factor model for industrial portfolios, decil portfolios sorted
by size, book-to-market ratio, and momentum, and decil portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic
coskewness beta. The results are presented in Table 4. When we test 10 portfolios sorted by
the book-to-market ratio, the inclusion of the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors reduces
the F-statistics from 4.96 to 1.95 in the Fama-French model and from 3.39 to 1.31 in the
Carhart model. Similar results are obtained for momentum-sorted portfolios and portfolios
sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness beta. In all cases, the inclusion of the two idiosyncratic
coskewness factors in either the Fama-French model or the Carhart model dramatically
reduces the F-statistics. The results suggest that the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors
can explain a signi¯cant part of the variation in returns even when factors based on size,
book-to-market ratio, and momentum are added to the asset pricing model.
3 Measuring Default Probability
3.1 Merton's Model
In the default risk literature, there are two approaches to measure default risk, the reduced-
form and structural approaches. A reduced-form model provides the maximum likelihood
estimates of a ¯rm's default probability based on the empirical frequency of default and
its correlation with various ¯rm characteristics. A structural model provides estimated
default probability which is theoretically motivated by the classical option-pricing models
15(Merton (1974)). Traditional reduced-form models, such as Altman (1968) Z-score model
and Ohlson (1980) O-score model, compute measures of bankruptcy by using accounting
information in conditional logit models. Accounting models use information from ¯rms'
¯nancial statement. The accounting information is about ¯rms' past performance, rather
than their future prospects. In contrast, structural models use the market value of equity
to derive measures of default risk. Market prices re°ect investors' expectations about ¯rms'
future performance. Therefore, they are better suited for measuring the probability that a
¯rm may default in the future. In this paper, we use Merton's (1974) model to estimate
the default probability of a ¯rm. In Merton's model, the equity of a ¯rm is viewed as a call
option on the value of ¯rm's assets. The ¯rm will default when the value of the ¯rm falls
below a strike price, which is measured as the book value of ¯rm's liabilities. The ¯rm value
is not observable and is assumed to follow a geometric Brownian motion of the form:
dVA = ¹AVAdt + ¾AVAdW; (8)
where VA is the value of ¯rm's assets, with an instantaneous drift ¹A, and an instantaneous
volatility ¾A. W is the standard Wiener process.
Let Xt denote the book value of ¯rm's liabilities at time t, which has a maturity at time
T. The value of equity is given by the Black and Scholes (1973) formula for call options:
VE = VAN(d1) + Xe
¡rTN(d2); (9)
where
d1 =
ln(VA=X) + (r + 1
2¾2
A)T
¾A
p
T
;d2 = d1 ¡ ¾A
p
T; (10)
r is the risk-free interest rate, and N is the cumulative density function of the standard
normal distribution.
16Using daily equity data from the past 12 months, we adopt a maximum likelihood method
developed by Duan (1998) to obtain an estimate of the volatility of ¯rm value ¾A. Duan
(1998) computes the likelihood function of equity returns by utilizing the conditional density
of the unobservable ¯rm value process. We repeat the estimation procedure at the end
of every month, resulting in monthly estimates of the volatility ¾A. We always keep the
estimation window to 12 months.
With an estimated ¾A, we can calculate daily values of VA for the last 12 months, and
then estimate the drift ¹A. At the end of every month t, the probability of default implied
by Merton's model is given by:
Pdef;t = N(
ln(VA;t=Xt) + (¹A ¡ 1
2¾2
A)T
¾A
p
T
): (11)
The Pdef;t calculated from equation (11) does not correspond to the true default proba-
bility of a ¯rm in large samples since we do not use data on actual defaults. However, we
use our measures to study the relationship between default risk and equity returns. The
di®erence between our measure of default probability and true default probability may not
be important as long as our measure correctly ranks ¯rms according to their true default
probability.
3.2 Data
One important parameter in Merton's model is the strike price, i.e. the book value of
debt. Most ¯rms have both long-term and short-term debts. Following KMV, we calculate
the book value of debt by using short-term debt plus half long-term debt. We use the
COMPUSTAT annual ¯les to obtain the ¯rm's \Debt in One Year" and \Long-Term Debt"
series for all ¯rms. Since debt data was not available for many ¯rms before 1970, the sample
period in our study is January 1971 to December 2006. In addition, ¯nancial ¯rms have
very di®erent capital structure than industrial ¯rms. We exclude all ¯nancial ¯rms (SIC
17codes: 6000{6999). We also exclude all utility ¯rms (SIC codes: 4900{4999) because many
utility ¯rms were highly regulated during our sample period. We use only industrial ¯rms
(SIC codes: 1{3999 and 5000{5999) in this studies since they are more suitable for Merton's
model. We obtain all industrial ¯rms with data available simultaneously on both CRSP and
COMPUSTAT databases.
We obtain the book value of debt from the COMPUSTAT annual ¯les. To avoid the
problem of delayed reporting, we lag the book value of debt by 3 months. This is to ensure
that our default probability measure is based on all information available to investors at the
time of calculation.
To compute the default likelihood measure, we obtain daily equity values for ¯rms from
CRSP daily ¯les, and the risk-free interest rate from the Fama-Bliss discount bond ¯le. We
use monthly observations of the 1-year Treasury bill rate and equity data for the past 12
months to calculate monthly default measures for all ¯rms.
When a ¯rm is in sever ¯nancial distress, its equity is not liquid with low prices. To
minimize liquidity e®ects on equity returns, we eliminate stocks with prices less than $1 at
the portfolio construction date, and stocks with less than 120 transactions in the past 12
months. In the end, we have 10,078 ¯rms with more than 3.5 million monthly observations
in the sample.
Figure 6 plots the average default probability for industrial ¯rms during the sample
period. The shaded areas represent the NBER recession periods. The graph shows that the
average default probability varies greatly and it usually peaks during recessions.
3.3 Measuring Performance of Merton's Model
To test the performance of Merton's model in predicting bankruptcy and other distress in our
sample, we construct two measures based on exchange delisting as proxies for bankruptcy.
One is a narrower measure of distress, called bankruptcy delisting (delisting codes: 400,
572, 574). The other is a broader measure of distress, called performance delisting (delisting
18codes: 400, 550 to 585). The second measure includes delisting due to not only bankruptcy
and liquidation but also insu±cient number of market makers, insu±cient capital, surplus,
and/or equity, price too low, delinquent in ¯ling, etc. All the delisting data are obtained
from CRSP.
To evaluate the predictive ability of our default measure to capture default risk, we sort
¯rms according to their estimated default probability based on past 12-month equity data.
At the end of each month from January 1971 through December 2006, default probability is
re-estimated using only historical data to avoid look-ahead bias. To pay greater attention to
the tail of default risk distribution, we follow Campbell et. al. and construct 10 portfolios
containing stocks in percentiles 0{5, 5{10, 10{20, 20{40, 40{60, 60{80, 80{90, 90{95, 95{
99, and 99{100 (P1 and P10 denote the portfolios with the lowest and the highest default
probability respectively). In the following month, we then collect the number of bankruptcy
and performance delistings for each portfolio. The summary results are reported in Table 5.
The evidence shows that the default risk measure based on Merton's model is a good ex ante
measure of probability of bankruptcy and other distress. The number of bankruptcy and
performance delistings generally increases with default risk measures from Merton's model.
During the sample period, 46 out of 60 delistings due to bankruptcy and liquidation, and 213
out of 443 delistings due to performance come from the two portfolios with highest default
measures. These two portfolios contains the highest-risk 5% of stocks.
3.4 Equity Returns on Distressed Stocks
We now examine the relationship between the likelihood of default and equity returns. Fama
and French (1996) and others have argued that ¯nancial stress may explain the size and value
premiums in equity returns. Vassalou and Xing (2004) provide some supporting evidences.
This conjecture, however, has proven di±cult to reconcile with other empirical ¯ndings
by Dichev (1998) and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), which show strong under-
performance among the group of ¯rms with the highest measures of ¯nancial distress.
19We use the same method, i.e. Merton's model, to estimate default likelihood as Vassalou
and Xing (2004). Unlike Vassalou and Xing (2004), we use only industrial ¯rms, which are
more suitable for Merton's model. We also minimize liquidity e®ects on equity returns by
eliminating illiquid stocks. At the end of each month, we sort ¯rms according to their default
measures and construct 10 portfolios as discussed in the previous section. Because highly
distressed ¯rms are more likely to be delisted and disappear from the CRSP database, it is
important to carefully compute equity returns for delisted ¯rms. CRSP reports a delisting
return for the ¯nal month of a ¯rm's life when it is available. In this case, we use delisting
returns to compute portfolio returns. When delisting returns are not available, we exclude
those ¯rms from portfolios. This assumes that those stocks are sold at the end of the month
before delisting, which implies an upward bias to the returns for distressed-stock portfolios
(Shumway (1997)).
Table 6 reports the summary statistics of equity returns on the ten distress-sorted port-
folios. The average returns are declining in general with default measures increasing. The
average return is 0.92% for the portfolio with the lowest default risk, and it is -0.51% for the
portfolio with the highest default risk. The volatilities of returns are increasing with default
measures. The standard deviation of returns is 4.48% for the portfolio with the lowest default
risk, and it is 14.95% for the portfolio with the highest default risk. In addition, returns on
portfolios with low default measures exhibit negative skewness, and returns on portfolio with
high default measures exhibit positive skewness. There is no clear pattern in the kurtosis of
returns. Table 6 also reports the unconditional coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness
betas, and idiosyncratic skewness of the ten distress-sorted portfolios. There is no clear pat-
tern in the coskewness betas. Howeve, both idiosyncratic coskewness betas and idiosyncratic
skewness are in general increasing with default measures. The average size of ¯rms in the
ten portfolios is monotonically declining with default measures increasing. It suggests that
controlling size risk factor will not explain the puzzling negative relation between equity
returns and default risk.
20A possible explanation for the negative relation between equity returns and default mea-
sures is that the default measure is just a proxy for other systematic risk factors. We test
this hypothesis with regressions. Table 8 reports the regression results. Panel A reports the
excess returns of ten distress-sorted portfolios and a long-short-portfolio that goes long the
portfolio with the lowest default risk, and short the portfolio with the highest default risk.
Panel A also reports the alphas in regressions of the portfolio excess returns on the CAPM
factor, Fama-French three factors, and four factors proposed by Carhart (1997) that includes
a momentum factor in addition to Fama-French three factors. The returns are reported in
monthly percentage points, with Robust Newey-West t-statistics below in the parentheses.
Panel B, C, and D report estimated factor loadings for excess returns on the CAPM factor,
Fama-French three factors, and four factors in the Carhart (1997) model. Figure 7 plots the
alphas from these regressions.
The average excess returns of the 10 stress-sorted portfolios reported in Table 8 are in
general declining in the default risk measure. The average excess return for the lowest-risk
5% of stocks is positive at 0.43% per month, and the average excess return for the highest-
risk 1% of stocks is negative at -0.99% per month. A long-short portfolio that goes long
the safest 5% of stocks, and short the most distressed 1% of stocks has an average return of
1.42% per month with a standard deviation of 14%. It implies a Sharp ratio of 0.10.
There is also a signi¯cant pattern on the factor loadings reported in Table 8. The low risk
portfolios in general have smaller market betas, negative loadings on the size factor SMB,
and negative loadings on the value factor HML. On the contrary, the high risk portfolios
in general have bigger market betas, positive loadings on the size factor SMB, and positive
loadings on the value factor HML. The results re°ect the fact that most distressed stocks
are small stocks with high book-to-market ratios. It implies that correcting risk using the
market factor or Fama-French factors will not solve the anomaly but worsen it. In fact,
the long-short portfolio longing the safest 5% of stocks, and shorting the most distressed
1% of stocks has a CAPM alpha of 1.94% per month with a t-statistic of 3.16. It has a
21Fama-French three-factor alpha of 2.76% per month with a t-statistic of 4.90. In addition,
the Fama-French three-factor alphas for all portfolios beyond 40th percentile of the default
risk distribution are negative and statistically signi¯cant.
Avramov, Chordia, Jostova, and Philipov (2007b) ¯nd a robust link between credit rating
and momentum. They ¯nd that momentum pro¯t exists only in low-grade ¯rms. Distressed
¯rms have negative momentum, which may explain their low average returns. When we
correct for risk by using Carhart (1997) four-factor model including a momentum factor,
the low risk portfolios in general have low and positive loadings on the momentum factor.
The high risk portfolios have high and negative loadings on the momentum factor. After
controlling for the momentum factor, we ¯nd that the alpha for the long-short portfolio is
cut almost in half, from 2.76% per month to 1.38% per month, which is still statistically
signi¯cant.
4 Explaining Equity Return Anomaly for Distressed
Firms
4.1 Default Risk and Idiosyncratic Coskewness
We have demonstrated that in a model with heterogeneous investors who care about the
skewness of their portfolios, the expected return of risky assets depends on their coskewness
betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas and idiosyncratic skewness. To capture the e®ect of
coskewness on cross-sectional equity returns, we construct a value-weighted hedge portfolio,
i.e. the coskewness factor, holding the portfolio with the lowest coskewness beta and shorting
the portfolio with the highest coskewness beta. In a similar fashion, we also construct a
hedge portfolio, i.e. the idiosyncratic skewness factor, to capture the e®ect of idiosyncratic
skewness.
We have shown that the standard risk factors, such as the market factor, the Fama-French
22factors, and the Carhart four risk factors, cannot explain why high distressed ¯rms earn low
equity returns. In our model, expected equity returns depends on not only their CAPM
betas, but also their coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas and idiosyncratic
skewness. We investigate if coskewness betas, idiosyncratic coskewness betas or idiosyncratic
skewness can help explain anomaly. We ¯rst run simple regression of returns of distress-sorted
portfolios on the market factor, the coskewness factor, the two idiosyncratic coskewness
factors, and the idiosyncratic skewness factor respectively. The results presented in 8 show
that the equity return anomaly for distressed ¯rms still exists when we control either the
market factor, the coskewness factor, or the idiosyncratic skewness factor. The monthly
return di®erence between portfolios with the lowest and highest default probabilities is 1.94%,
1.41%, and 1.66% respectively when we control for the market factor, the coskewness factor,
and the idiosyncratic skewness factor. The return di®erences are statistically signi¯cant
at 5% level. However, the monthly return di®erence between portfolios with the lowest and
highest default probabilities is 0.73% and 0.89% respectively when we control for the positive
and negative idiosyncratic coskewness factors. The return di®erences are not statistically
signi¯cant at 5% level.
The simple regression results show that either positive or negative idiosyncratic coskew-
ness factors can at least partially explain why equity returns are low for high distressed
¯rms. High distressed ¯rms will earn low equity returns if they have negative loadings on
the positive idiosyncratic coskewness factor and positive loadings on the negative idiosyn-
cratic coskewness factor. We will further test this hypothesis by regressing distress-sorted
portfolio returns on two idiosyncratic coskewness factors, ICSK1 and ICSK2. We will also
test the robustness of our results by including other risk factors, such as the Fama-French
factors and the momentum factor, in the regressions. The regression results are reported in
Table 9.
When we regress excess returns for distress-sorted portfolios on the two idiosyncratic
coskewness factors, we ¯nd a striking variations in factor loadings across portfolios. The fac-
23tor loadings for factor ICSK1 are almost monotonically declining with default risk increasing.
In contrast, the factor loadings for factor ICSK2 are almost monotonically increasing with
default risk. The portfolio with the highest default risk has negative loadings on factor ICSK1
and positive loadings on ICSK2. They are both statistically signi¯cant at 1% level. Since
a positive loading on factor ICSK1 and a negative loading on ICSK2 will reduce expected
excess return. Controlling for the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors help explain the eq-
uity return anomaly for distressed ¯rms. The same result can be found in the regression of
excess returns for a long-short portfolio holding the safest portfolio and shorting the most
risky portfolio on the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors. The factor loading is positive for
factor ICSK1 and negative for factor ICSK2. Both loadings are statistically signi¯cant. Con-
trolling for the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors cuts alphas for the long-short portfolio
roughly in half, from 1.42% to 0.64%, and it is not statistically signi¯cant.
To examine robustness of our ¯ndings, we include four standard risk factors (MKT,
SMB, HML, UMD)in the regression. For the ten distress-sorted portfolios and the long-short
portfolio, the factor loadings on the two idiosyncratic coskewness remain similar. Alpha for
the long-short portfolio is 0.73% with a t-statistic of 1.11.
The results show that the explanatory power of the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors
is large for ¯rms on both tails of the distribution of distress measures. The adjusted R2 in
the regression of returns of the long-short portfolio based on default measures on the two
idiosyncratic coskewness factors is 28%. The negative loading on ICSK1 and positive loading
on ICSK2 help reduce the alpha for the long-short portfolio based on distress measures.
5 Conclusion
We build a theoretical model of heterogeneous skewness preference that leads to asset-pricing
relationships, in addition to equity, that di®er from the standard CAPM model. We show
that the expected excess return on a skewed security depends on four terms. The ¯rst term
24is the standard risk premium in the CAPM model, the second term is the asset's coskewness
premium put forward in Harvey and Siddique (2000), the third term is the idiosyncratic
coskewness betas which measures the covariance of the squared idiosyncratic shock and the
market return. The last term represents the asset idiosyncratic skewness. When the asset's
idiosyncratic coskewness is zero, the model reduces to Mitton and Vorkink (2008).
We empirically show that in addition to the well known idiosyncratic skewness, the
idiosyncratic coskewness measure is also an important determinant for asset returns, and
provide a rational explanation on the seemingly anomalous negative relation between default
risk and equity returns. Although a number of theories point toward a lower return for
stocks with default risk, empirical testing of the relation between default risk and measures
of idiosyncratic skewness has been slow in coming. We attempt to ¯ll this void by estimating
a model of idiosyncratic coskewness and then using idiosyncratic coskewness to explain the
negative relation between default risk and equity returns.
We ¯nd a negative (negative) relation between expected equity returns and idiosyncratic
coskewness when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive (negative). We then construct
two idiosyncratic coskewness factors to capture time series variations of equity returns sorted
by idiosyncratic coskewness betas. We ¯nd that the standard market, size, value and mo-
mentum factors cannot explain the excess returns of the two idiosyncratic coskewness factors.
These two idiosyncratic coskewness factors can explain a large variation of distress-sorted
portfolio returns. High stressed ¯rms earn low returns because high stressed ¯rms have high
idiosyncratic coskewness betas when idiosyncratic coskewness betas are positive, and high
stressed ¯rms have low idiosyncratic coskewness betas when idiosyncratic coskewness betas
are negative. Also noteworthy is that our measure of idiosyncratic coskewness cannot be
explain by the idiosyncratic skewness, this suggests that both idiosyncratic skewness and
idiosyncratic coskewness measures di®erent higher moment risks.
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32Table 5: Predictive Performance of Merton's Model
This table reports the number of bankruptcy and performance delistings as a function of default risk rank
based on Merton's model. At the end of each month ¯rms are assigned into portfolios according to their
probability of default measures. We construct 10 portfolios containing stocks in percentiles 0-5, 5-10,
10-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, 80-90, 90-95, 95-99, and 99-100 of the distribution of the default measure.
Portfolio 1 contains ¯rms with the lowest default probability measure. BD is the number of bankruptcy
and liquidation delistings, and PD is the number of performance delistings. The sample period is January
1971 to December 2006.
Number of Number of
Bankruptcy Delistings Performance Delistings
Portfolio (BD) (PD)
1 0 2
2 0 3
3 1 11
4 0 23
5 1 27
6 2 42
7 3 55
8 7 67
9 20 111
10 26 102
33Table 6: Summary Statistics of Returns on Distress-Sorted Portfolios
This table reports the mean, standard deviation, skewness, and kurtosis of monthly returns, in percentage
points, on ten distress-sorted portfolios. It also reports unconditional coskewness betas, idiosyncratic
coskewness betas, and idiosyncratic skewness of the ten portfolios, as well as the average size, in million
dollars, of ¯rms in each portfolio. At the end of each month ¯rms are assigned into portfolios according
to their probability of default measures. We construct 10 portfolios containing stocks in percentiles 0-5,
5-10, 10-20, 20-40, 40-60, 60-80, 80-90, 90-95, 95-99, and 99-100 of the distribution of the default measure.
Portfolio 1 contains ¯rms with the lowest default probability measure. Value-weighted realized returns
in the next month are calculated for the ten portfolios. The sample period is January 1971 to December
2006.
0005 0510 1020 2040 4060 6080 8090 9095 9599 9900
Mean 0.92 0.98 1.17 1.03 1.01 0.88 0.81 0.36 0.41 ¡0.51
Stdev 4.48 4.40 4.36 4.87 5.81 6.57 7.64 9.02 10.70 14.96
Skew ¡0.29 ¡0.48 ¡0.16 ¡0.37 ¡0.41 ¡0.27 0.15 0.49 0.86 0.81
Kurt 5.42 4.94 4.65 5.53 5.28 5.13 7.53 9.82 13.36 7.65
Coskew(10¡4) 0.31 ¡0.69 1.69 0.05 ¡0.95 ¡1.60 ¡1.70 ¡2.84 ¡2.89 0.76
Idio. Coskew(10¡2) 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.04 0.09 0.22 0.30 0.65
Idio. Skew ¡0.26 ¡0.41 0.21 0.48 0.16 0.34 1.05 1.01 1.71 0.95
Mean size 4.90 4.33 2.80 1.43 0.71 0.35 0.18 0.11 0.10 0.07
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Figure 3: Cross-Sectional Relation Between Idiosyncratic Coskewness on Idiosyn-
cratic Skewness )
This graph plots estimated slope coe±cients and R2 from regressions of idiosyncratic coskewness betas on
idiosyncratic skewness each month. The sample period is January 1971 to December 2006. Idiosyncratic
coskewness betas on idiosyncratic skewness are calculated using past 12-month daily returns for each
¯rm
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Figure 4: Alphas of Portfolios Sorted by Idiosyncratic Coskewness Betas (Positive
Values)
This graph plots monthly excess returns of 10 portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas (positive
values), and alphas with respect to the CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama-French (1993), and four-
factor model of Carhart (1997). The sample period is January 1971 to December 2006. Portfolios are
formed at the beginning of each month during the sample period.
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Figure 5: Alphas of Portfolios Sorted by Idiosyncratic Coskewness Betas (Negative
Values)
This graph plots monthly excess returns of 10 portfolios sorted by idiosyncratic coskewness betas (negative
values), and alphas with respect to the CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama-French (1993), and four-
factor model of Carhart (1997). The sample period is January 1971 to December 2006. Portfolios are
formed at the beginning of each month during the sample period.
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Figure 6: Average Default Probability
This graph plots monthly average default probabilities. The shaded areas denote recession periods, as
de¯ned by NBER. The sample period is January 1971 to December 2006.
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Figure 7: Alphas of Distress-Sorted Portfolios
This graph plots monthly excess returns of ten distress-sorted portfolios, and alphas with respect to the
CAPM, the three-factor model of Fama-French (1993), and four-factor model of Carhart (1997). The
sample period is January 1971 to December 2006. Portfolios are formed at the beginning of each month
during the sample period.
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